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TFP Estimation at Firm Level: 
 The Fiscal Aspect of Productivity Convergence in the UK  
1. Introduction 
Productivity growth in the UK has been sluggish during the last ten years following a 
similar trend in many OECD countries (McMorrow et al., 2010; Braconier et al., 2014). The 
consensus in the literature has been how policy changes affect productivity performance, 
including product and labour market regulations (Bourlès et al., 2013; Andrews and Cingano, 
2014; Bravo-Biosca et al., 2016). There is very limited evidence on how fiscal changes affect 
productivity at the firm level (Arnold et al., 2011), which is a vital issue given the evolution 
of recent literature about firm heterogeneity and public policy changes (Bernard et al., 2012). 
The present paper aims to understand the evolution of firm Total Factor Productivity (TFP)1 
in a large group of UK Manufacturing Firms during a period of substantial financial 
turbulence and changes in the corporate tax schedule.2  
A central issue in implementing this empirical investigation is to obtain reliable 
measures of TFP at the firm level. We treat this part of the analysis systematically and not as 
a trivial mechanical process. There is a bulk of literature focusing on alternative approaches 
for the estimation of productivity (Biesebroeck, 2007; Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010; Del 
Gatto et al., 2011; Van Beveren, 2012). Nonetheless, the enormous heterogeneity across 
firms suggests that the appropriateness of each method for TFP calculation depends on the 
nature of data in use and more importantly to what extent the underlying assumptions of each 
method are compatible to the data generating process (DGP). Conceptually, TFP is a residual 
which represents the amount of output that cannot be explained by the use of inputs. This 
definition highlights the existence of unobservables in the productivity measurement that 
should be controlled accurately in order to avoid misspecification and errors in TFP 
computations. The contribution of the paper is twofold: first, we provide a comprehensive 
discussion of the most up to date approaches in measuring TFP including non-parametric, 
parametric and semi-parametric techniques that we apply in a large data set of UK 
manufacturing firms over the period 2004-2011. The objective of this illustration seeks to 
compare merits and weaknesses of each methodology and then to identify the degree of 
1 The terms TFP and productivity are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
2 There was a change in statutory corporate tax rate from 0% to 19% in 2006 for small firms, while the tax rate 
was reduced for medium sized enterprises from 23.75% to 19%. Other variations also apply for large sized 
enterprises during 2004-2011 (see Appendix 2). 
                                                          
correlation and commonality across TFP methods. This part of the analysis is also used to 
evaluate the effect of the 2009 global financial crisis on the TFP evolution of UK 
Manufacturing firms. The second part of the paper, which is our second contribution, 
investigates the effects of tax burden on TFP assessing whether the nature of the corporate 
tax-TFP relationship is robust or subject to TFP computation choices and definition of 
variables.  
Regarding the nexus of corporate tax-TFP, the paper puts forward a simple as well as 
an intuitive hypothesis that a higher level of profit tax bill induces distortive effects on 
productivity growth. This argument draws upon the fiscal effects on R&D on the one hand 
(Hall and Van Reenen, 2000) and on investment and entrepreneurship (Djankov et al., 2010) 
on the other. Both strands of the literature highlight the existence of two mechanisms though 
which corporate taxation can generate distortive effects on firm performance (Lucas, 1990)3. 
First, a higher statutory tax increases the user cost of capital, which might serve as a 
disincentive for gaining higher profitability through the use of new capital equipment 
(Fullerton, 1987; Hubbard, 1998; Devereux and Griffith, 2003).4 Second, more recent studies 
(Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2013; Brekke et al., 2014) associate corporate tax liabilities with the 
existence of moral hazard and asymmetric information between the firm and its external 
creditors. As firms operate under financial constraints, their current income is the main asset 
that can be promised for loan repayment, and, therefore, anything that decreases cash flows 
and working capital such as tax liability can also weaken the borrowing capacity of the firm. 
Following this argument, the weakening of borrowing capacity due to lower post-tax income 
undermines the ability to invest in productivity enhancing investment; thus productivity 
growth slows down.   
The effect of a weaker borrowing capacity due to higher tax liability affects 
disproportionally the groups of firms that are typically more risk-takers, and thus more 
dependent on the use of external finance (Cullen and Gordon, 2007; Bricongne, 2012). 
Representative examples of firms with greater exposure to risk are R&D and exporting firms. 
R&D activity usually encounters substantial sunk costs that must be covered up-front and 
will require substantial liquidity usually obtained from external creditors. In addition, R&D 
projects always involve a high degree of uncertainty, which generates pressure for cash-flows 
3 Lucas (1990) supports the view that corporate income should not be taxed in the long run as this income is the 
main engine of investment and growth (also see Zellner and Ngoie, 2015). 
4 The effect of corporate income tax on investment is initially founded in the seminal paper of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). In their set up, firms operate in a financially unconstrained environment; so a higher level of 
marginal corporate tax affects only the marginal cost of investment. In a more complex business environment 
corporate tax might also impact a firm’s ability to gain external finance. 
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and sufficient working capital, covered from external financial sources (Mánez et al., 2014). 
Firms prefer outsourcing research activities in geographical regions with low corporate tax 
while locating final production units in markets with high consumer tax rates (i.e., VAT) 
(Dischingier and Riedel, 2011). This within-firm fragmentation of production implies that 
R&D firms make decisions regarding location of research activities taking into account the 
corporate tax regime.  
 In a similar line of argument, exporters encounter higher levels of business costs 
relative to non-exporters due to the establishment of new market and transportation networks, 
which require substantial financial strength (Görg and Spaliara, 2014).  Reducing the scale of 
research and export activity due to higher corporate tax liabilities is likely to induce 
substantial productivity losses that might affect both the evolution of TFP and the catch up 
process towards the frontier.   
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 overviews five main approaches in the 
measurement of TFP at the firm level; section 3 shows results from a neo-Schumpeterian 
model of TFP catch up which permits us to assess the role of corporate tax on both the rate of 
TFP growth and TFP convergence, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. TFP Estimation: Methodology and Measurement  
2.1 Non-Parametric Techniques and Superlative Index Numbers  
We start with the index number approach in the TFP measurement. The main advantage 
of this approach is the degree of flexibility in accommodating different underlying production 
functions. Additionally, this non-parametric approach avoids the usual econometric bias in 
the estimation of production input parameters. Nonetheless, the index number approach uses 
some fairly strong economic assumptions with the most prominent being the existence of 
perfect competition in product and input markets. Let us specify a standard Cobb-Douglass 
production function: 
 
     k la ait it it itY A K L=                    [0.1] 
K  and L  represent capital stock and labour input for firm i at year t, parameter A stands for 
Hicks neutral technical change (TFP). Based on this set-up, productivity is derived as: 
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Equation [2.2] expresses productivity (the ratio of output to weighted capital and labour). The 
weight is the share of labour a  calculated as labour cost to value added, and under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale, capital share is 1 a− . Because the aggregate sum of 
inputs is not scale invariant, the TFP measures make better sense if they are compared to a 
reference point. In the seminal work of Solow (1957), production units are characterized from 
cost minimizing behavior; so the TFP formula can be viewed as a discrete approximation to 
the Divisia index. Caves et al. (1982) provide a broader interpretation of this, considering that 
the Tőrnqvist index number has a broader validity as it allows the derivation of TFP from 
more flexible underlying production functions such as the translog. The Tőrnqvist index 
proposed in Caves et al., (1982) is: 
 (ln ln ) [ (ln ln ) (1 )(ln ln )]L Lit t it it t it it tTFP Y Y a L L a K K≡ − − − + − −    [0.3] 
With 
2
L L
L it t
it
a aa += , upper bar in labour share represents the arithmetic mean across all 
observations in the sample in year t, while upper bars above inputs and output denote 
geometric means in year t. There are two disadvantages with the Tőrnqvist index specified in 
[2.3]; first labour share a  is in fact a revenue share and it is biased if market structure 
deviates from perfect competition, which raises the need to adjust observed labour shares to 
total cost.5 Second, this approach does not allow for any measurement error, which is easily 
accommodated in parametric estimations.  
 
2.2 Parametric Estimates of TFP and Simultaneity Bias 
The next family of estimators specifies a parametric log-linear form (letters in lower cases) of 
the production function [2.1] in order to recover estimates for labour and capital shares.   
 
 0it k it l it it ity a a k a l= + + + +ω ε   [0.4] 
 
The technical efficiency parameter is decomposed as follows: 0ln jt it itA a ω ε= + + , itω  and itε  
are i.i.d idiosyncratic error terms. It is assumed that itω  is an unobserved factor that affects 
firm i’s output, ε is a random noise to capture measurement error, and constant 0a  represents 
mean efficiency across all firms. In parametric estimations, parameter itω  is further 
5 See Hall (1998), Roeger (1995) and De-Loecker (2012) for the construction of price mark-ups associated with 
the measurement of market power. 
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decomposed to include firm ( iη ) specific and time ( tλ ) specific effects. Therefore, an 
estimating specification of [2.4] takes the form: 
 0it k it l it t t it ity a a k a l= + + + + + +η l ω ε    [0.5] 
In estimating parameters ka  and la with OLS raises the issue of selection bias between 
unobserved productivity shocks ,i tω - which is observed for the firm but remain unobserved 
for the econometrician - and inputs k and l in period t.6  In the presence of selection bias, the 
exogeneity assumption Ε[ ] 0it itω l ≠  is violated leading to an upward bias of labour coefficient 
( ˆk ka a> ). 
A approach potentially suitable for tackling selection bias includes the instrumentation 
of k and l using either dynamic panel estimators or control function approaches. In dynamic 
panel estimations, endogeneity bias can be addressed by using input prices as instruments. In 
theory, prices can serve as valid instruments as being informative about input quantities while 
being unaffected from firm choice. The empirical implementation of this strategy is rather 
challenging as firm specific prices at micro level are rare while the use of industry specific 
price has limited variation causing instrument identification problems (Katayama et al., 
2009). A commonly used approach is own instrumentation of endogenous variables within 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) framework. The main motivation for a GMM 
estimation of [2.5] is associated with the high degree of persistence in itω  that is assumed to 
follow an AR(1) process: 
 1it it itω ρω θ−= +  with 1ρ <   and (0)itθ MA�   [0.6] 
To address persistence, equation [2.5] is transformed into an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model with the inclusion of lag y as well as lags of k and l on the right-hand side: 
 1 1 1
0 1 1(1 )( ) ( ) ( )
it it k it k it l it k it
i t t it it it
y y k k l l
a
− − −
− −
= + − + −
+ − + + + + + −
ρ a ρa a ρa
ρ η l ρl θ ε ρε
  [0.7] 
The unobserved productivity term itω is now removed in this representation, nonetheless 
there is still bias between lagged ity  and itθ , which casts serious doubts about the 
appropriateness of standard OLS and FE estimators.7 Estimation of [2.7] calls for the use of 
6 This is also known as transmission bias from unobservable productivity realisations to input choices 
(Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
7 The bias of estimating a dynamic model with the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side is of the 
order 1/T, where T is the number of time series (Nickell, 1981). Monte Carlo experiments show (Judson and 
Owen, 1999) that FE and OLS cannot address this bias satisfactorily in panels with large cross-sections and 
short time series, as it is the dimensionality of the present data set.  
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valid instruments that need to satisfy two conditions: (a) being correlated with the 
endogenous regressors, and (b) being uncorrelated with the error term itθ  (which is now part 
of the productivity component).  The lags of k and l are possible set of instruments for 1ity − , 
1itΔk −  and 1itΔl − (Wooldridge, 2009).  A potential issue with this instrumentation strategy is 
the high degree of persistence in the DGP of inputs, which points to weak identification (as it 
is also the case with industry specific input prices as instruments). To overcome weak 
identification problems, the system GMM (GMM-SYS, hereafter) Blundell and Bond (1998) 
is developed, which uses the same principles of the differenced specification of [2.7] adding 
two moment restrictions that inputs in lagged differences are uncorrelated with the error term 
itθ , Ε[ ] 0 and Ε[ ] 0it s it it s itΔk θ Δl θ− −= = . This assumption allows estimating directly the 
untransformed production function [2.5] using as instruments the second order lags of inputs 
in differences. The validity of these moment conditions depends on the absence of serial 
correlation in itε . The GMM-SYS estimator is regarded as the best option among the 
parametric approaches for addressing simultaneity bias and random measurement errors in 
both output and inputs (Griliches and Mairesee, 1995; Van Biesebroeck, 2007).8 Bond and 
Söderbom (2005) provide a structural motivation for the appropriateness of GMM-SYS 
estimator, which assumes that all inputs are subject to variant adjustment costs. Therefore, the 
optimal choice of inputs across firms varies, providing a more theoretical justification for the 
use of lagged inputs as identifying instruments for the values of current inputs.9  
 
2.3 Semi Parametric Estimates 
2.3.1 Olley and Pakes Algorithm 
The first semi-parametric approach in estimating a production function is initiated from 
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP hereafter). The initial set-up is a Cobb-Douglass similar to [2.1] 
using a more structural framework for deriving production input estimates.  They first set up 
a profit maximisation problem to derive investment as a proxy for the unobserved 
productivity itω .
10 Every period t firm i decides whether to “exit” or “stay” in the market. In 
the conditional “stay” decision i also decides the amount of investment I and labour l. Capital 
8 An additional advantage of system GMM is that Blundell and Bond (1998) estimators provide over 
identification test for the validity of instruments.   
9 There is dynamic dependence in inputs; so lagged values provide information about the amount of adjustment 
costs. 
10 This section shows the estimation procedure for more technical aspects of this algorithm; we refer the reader 
to Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Olley and Pakes (1996). 
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stock is accumulated as: , , , 1(1 )i t i t i tk k i −= − +δ . The investment function depends on two state 
variables, capital stock itk and productivity itω , ( , )it it iti i k= ω . Given that the investment is 
strictly monotonic, we can define the inverse investment function:  
 ( , )it it ith k i=ω  with 
1(.)h i−=   [0.8] 
  
By substituting equation (2.8) into (2.4), the production function becomes as follows: 
 ,( , )it l it it it i ty a l k i= + +φ ε   [0.9] 
  
where 0( , ) ( , )it it k it it itk i a a k h k i= + +φ . The OP algorithm is implemented in two stages, in the 
first stage, an OLS is used to estimate [2.9] to get values for the labour coefficient la (the 
variable input). Function ( , )it itk iφ  is approximated by an higher order polynomial in iti  and 
itk .
11 In the second stage, the OP algorithm runs a regression of ˆit l ity a l−  on ˆ ( , )it it itk iφ  in 
order to obtain an estimate for ka  (the state input). To recover the capital coefficient, it is 
assumed that productivity itω  follows a first order Markov process: [ ]1|it it it it−= Ε +ω ω ω θ  , 
where itθ  is a an idiosyncratic error term of the productivity function. Plugging into the 
Markov process of the inverse investment function, we get: 
 [ ]1 , 1 1 1 1 0 1| ( ) ( ( , ) ))it it it i t it it it it it k it itf f i k a a k− − − − − −= Ε + = + = − − +ω ω ω θ ω θ φ θ  [0.10] 
Intuitively, equation [2.10] states that unobserved productivity at time t is a function of 
observed productivity at t-1. Substituting [2.10] into the production function, we derive the 
estimating equation of the second stage in the OP algorithm.   
 1 1 1 0 1ˆˆ ( ( , ) ))it l it k it it it it k it it ity a l a k f i k a a k− − − −− = + − − + +φ θ ε   [0.11] 
          
Function f(.) is a control function approximated by a higher order polynomial and its 
estimated coefficient has no economic interpretation.  From [2.11] we obtain an unbiased 
capital coefficient ka using a non-linear estimation - as ka  appears twice in [2.11] and in 
combination with other parameters - with bootstrapped standard errors. The rationale behind 
stage two in OP is that capital stock is predetermined in period t as investment (the proxy 
variable) is decided in period t-1. Therefore in estimating [2.9], itk  is exogenous to itθ (the 
11 In the original Olley and Pakes (1996), a third order polynomial is assumed but any other non-parametric 
functions (such as the kernel density functions) are equally valid. 
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productivity shock term) and cannot be affected by productivity. This way, the OP algorithm 
addresses the simultaneity bias between itω  and itk  under the assumption that labour is 
perfectly flexible (non-dynamic)12. 
 
 
2.3.2 Levinsohn and Petrin Algorithm 
 
The second semi-parametric technique is the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), (LP hereafter). 
This technique shares many similarities with OP, especially as far as the estimation of la  is 
concerned, but it seeks to address a major concern underlying the assumption of strict 
monotonicity in OP. The monotonicity assumption requires that iti  is strictly increasing in 
itω , which might not hold in practice when there are missing investment values or a 
significant number of zero investment values in the data. Therefore, the empirical validity of 
the monotonicity assumption in OP depends on the data series in use, which might be proved 
problematic for the FAME data that commonly reports missing values for various variables. 
LP tackles this limitation employing intermediate inputs itm   as a proxy variable for 
unobserved productivity instead of iti .  Intermediate inputs itm  are now expressed as function 
of capital and productivity, ( , )it it itm m ω k= . Given that the monotonicity condition is 
satisfied and materials are strictly increasing in itω , the m function can be inverted. Therefore, 
the first stage equation in LP is:   
 ,( , )it l it m it it it i ty a l a m k m= + + +ϕ ε   [0.12] 
with 10 ( , )k it it ita a k m k m
−= + +ϕ  where 1m−  is the inverse intermediate inputs function. In the 
LP algorithm, gross output is used as measure of ity  usually approximated with revenue. It 
should be noted that the coefficient of the intermediate inputs ma  in LP is estimated in the 
second state alongside with ka . Since itm  is not orthogonal with respect to itθ - the 
idiosyncratic shock term in the Markov process of itω - the LP algorithm instruments itm with
1itm − . The second stage in LP estimates the following specification as: 
 1 1 1 0 1 1ˆˆ ( ( , ) ))it l it k it m it it it it k it m it it ity a l a k a m f m k a a k a m− − − − −− = + + − − − + +φ θ ε  [0.13] 
12 A non-dynamic input means that the choice of this input in year t does not affect costs and profits in year t+1. 
In other words, within the OP set-up, labour is perfectly adjustable in year t and chosen after productivity itω is 
observed.  
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Estimation of [2.13] is implemented within a GMM framework considering the following 
moment conditions: E[ ] 0it itk θ =  and 1E[ ] 0it itm θ− = .  
 
 
2.3.3 Ackerberg, Caves and Fraser Algorithm 
Ackerberg Caves and Fraser (2015) (ACF hereafter) suggest the third semi-parametric 
technique. This procedure allows for a dynamic specification in the choice of labour. In both 
OP and LP, labour is considered as a perfectly adjustable input, which is estimated in the first 
stage. ACF view this assumption as too strong and consider a case in which choices of labour 
also depend on unobserved productivity itω . This consideration implies that first stage 
regressions [2.9] and [2.12] suffer from collinearity and identification problems as the 
distribution of la  and itω  do not vary from each other. ACF consider that labour is a function 
of state variables too: ( , )it it itl l ω k= . To identify labour, ACF assume that the firm chooses 
labour at period t-s where 0<s<1. This implies that the firm chooses labour after capital - still 
determined in period t-1 - and before intermediate inputs, which are chosen in period t. 
Therefore, labour is now an element of the demand function for intermediate inputs in period 
t, ( , , )it it it itm m ω k l= . This function is still invertible as long as m is strictly increasing in itω . 
The first stage equation in ACF is defined as: 
 ( , )it it it ity k m= +ξ ε   [0.14] 
With 10 ( , , )k it l it it ita a k a l m k m l
−= + + +ξ  where 1m− is the inverse of intermediate inputs 
function. The first stage estimation in ACF regresses output on a polynomial function of 
capital, intermediate inputs and labour to net out random noise and (or) measurement errors 
related to ,i tε , while all production coefficients are recovered in the second stage with the 
following moment restrictions: 
 
 E[ ] 0it itk θ =  and 1E[ ] 0it itl θ− =   [0.15] 
The estimates of ka , la  and ma in the second stage of ACF are derived from GMM relying on 
the orthogonality conditions in [2.15]. 
To sum up, the main message from the discussion in this section is that each method 
deals with a different challenge in estimating the production function. The approach of each 
methodology relies on different assumptions whose empirical verification is always subject to 
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data scrutiny. For instance, when firms are characterized from substantial technological 
heterogeneity, the non-parametric TFP index is preferred to parametric estimations (Van 
Biesebroeck, 2007). 13  On the other hand, when production is subject to variant returns to 
scale, then capital share cannot be derived as one minus the labour share and a parametric 
estimation is more appropriate. Among parametric approaches, the GMM-SYS is the most 
robust estimator to tackle simultaneity bias and measurement errors. Nonetheless, the 
empirical functionality of GMM-SYS is always under scrutiny for instruments identification. 
Semi-parametric techniques are designed to address simultaneity bias between unobserved 
productivity and selection of inputs using two stages estimation.14 To provide a more 
concrete guidance regarding the suitability of each methodology, an experimental exercise 
using simulated data is in order. Nonetheless, semi-parametric algorithms are structural 
estimators derived from a firm maximizing behavior, in which case the DGP is not as generic 
as it should have been in any other random economic series; therefore, we prefer to test the 
empirical performance of these estimators using observational data from UK Manufacturing 
firms. In what follows, we estimate the production functions using four alternative 
approaches (GMM-SYS, OP, LP, ACF) and then we derive the associated TFP indices. The 
fifth TFP index is constructed from a purely non-parametric technique, equation [2.3], 
without estimating directly parameters of the production inputs.  
  
2.4 The FAME Data 
The data refer to UK Manufacturing firms taken from FAME (Bureau Van Dijk). The 
initial number of firms includes 13062 firms for the period 2004-2011. These firms cover the 
following NACE Rev.2 codes: 1011-3299. FAME data are extracted from Profit-Loss and 
Balance sheets. For the second section of the paper we employ data for R&D expenses and 
foreign sales (exports). There are two main features of the FAME database. First, there is a 
bias towards large companies; particularly non-exporting ones (Gal, 2010); second, there are 
missing values in production inputs making production function and TFP estimates sensitive 
in the way missing values are treated. The second feature is of special relevance for the 
13 In cases of time variant heterogeneity (stochastic heterogeneity), the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) is 
the appropriate method (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003 for a review). 
14 Wooldridge (2009) provides a technique that estimates a production function similar to those shown in [2.9], 
[2.11] and [2.14] within one stage GMM framework. Their two main differences between Wooldridge (2009) 
and the other semi-parametric techniques are outlined in this paper. First, the one stage estimation tends to be 
more efficient avoiding potential correlation between errors in two steps and second, the one step GMM can 
produce robust standard errors unlike other semi–parametric techniques that rely on bootstrapped standard 
errors. Nonetheless, gains from consistency and accuracy of Wooldridge (2009) estimator are coming at a cost 
of computational intensity (Mollisi and Rovigatti, 2017).   
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empirical validity of the monotonicity assumption in iti  for OP and itm  for LP; thus one 
needs to know whether our TFP estimates vary substantially between those two algorithms. 
We measure ity  with value added, which is calculated as total sales minus costs of 
materials and inventories. We convert sales from FAME into real values using a 4-digit 
NACE industry production price deflator (2005=100) taken from the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS). Similarly, we deflate material expenditures (m) and fixed assets (capital 
input) with industry invariant material and capital asset deflators (ONS), respectively. We 
dropped observations with missing output deflators, especially in cases when the industry 
NACE classification could not match the ONS classification. There are also observations 
with negative or missing values for sales as firms usually carry forward losses from previous 
years. We cannot have observations with negative values of output; so we were forced to 
drop them.  
The capital stock is measured using the book value of fixed assets as reported in 
FAME. Investment, the proxy for unobserved TFP shocks in OP algorithm is derived from 
rearranging the standard perpetual inventory formula: 1 (1 )it it iti k k+= − −δ , where δ  is the rate 
of physical depreciation taken at the level of 20%. This formula requires value of fixed assets 
for 2012 for the computation of investment values for 2011. The time series dimension of our 
panel reaches up to 2011; we extrapolate the 2012 values of fixed assets in order to obtain 
investment data for 2011. A possible treatment for missing values is imputation (Gal, 2013); 
nonetheless, we prefer losing information to using imputed values that are essentially 
artificial data. We prefer imputing missing values with linear interpolation only in the number 
of employees (labour). After this cleaning process, the resulting data set is an unbalanced 
panel for the period 2004-2011.15  
 
2.5 Production Function Estimates and TFP Measures 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for output and inputs.  
  Table 1: Summary Statistics - UK Manufacturing Firms, 2004-2011  
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max 
y 58469 8.071 1.405 -3.420 16.624 
l 67763 4.568 1.343 2.302 11.600 
k 92539 7.164 2.083 -0.156 18.683 
m 59289 8.962 1.530 -0.972 17.028 
N is the number of observations. All variables are specified in logs. 
15 Given the unbalanced sample used, all estimates reported in the paper allow for implicit entry and exit of 
firms. 
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 Estimates from parametric and semi-parametric estimators are shown in Table 2. The 
first estimator in Column 1 shows results from the GMM-SYS with the inclusion of 1ity −  on 
the right hand side. For comparability, the GMM-SYS estimator maintains the assumption of 
predetermined capital in year t also specified in OP, LP and ACF. The model in column 1 
reports test results for serial correlation in the residuals. There is no evidence for AR(2) in the 
residuals. As expected, the current data series represent high degree of persistence with the 
estimated coefficient of 1ty −  to be 0.79, which raises the issue of weak instrumentation in the 
estimation of the differenced equation (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). To avoid weak 
instrumentation, we specify lagged values in levels from t-2 up to t-4 as instruments for the 
differenced equation. The Sargan test (p-value=0.1386) indicates that the overall 
instrumentation strategy of the GMM-SYS is valid (i.e. exogeneity of instruments cannot be 
rejected). 
 Columns 2-4 show estimates from OP, LP and ACF. Turning to input coefficients, all 
models point to the existence of decreasing returns as specified by the Wald test, which can 
be viewed as evidence for the limitation of the index number approach that assumes constant 
returns to scale. Capital coefficient takes its highest value in the ACF estimation ˆ 0.13k ≈  
while lˆ  is ranged from 0.32 to 0.69. The estimated coefficient of labour is significantly lower 
in LP relative to OP and ACF indicating that the first stage estimation in LP under-identifies 
the contribution of labour. On the other hand, OP produces a statistically insignificant capital 
coefficient. These features in the input estimates for UK manufacturing firms are similar with 
those obtained in Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) that employ a smaller sample of firms from 
FAME. Unfortunately, given that sample sizes vary across models in Table 2, we do not 
provide a diagnostic test that could have served as a measure for the statistical performance 
of the four alternative estimators. Nonetheless, given the evidence from Monte Carlo 
experiments in Ackerberg et al. (2015), where ACF is found to be superior to LP16 and the 
striking coefficients of l in LP and k in OP, we could argue that the ACF estimator that treats 
labour as a dynamic input is the best alternative within the group of semi-parametric 
estimators. 
 
 
16 ACF shows a Mean Square Error (MSE) to be persistently smaller than LP’s. 
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Table 2: Production Function Estimates for UK Manufacturing Firms, 2004-2011 
 GMM-SYS OP LP ACF 
kt 0.11* 0.012 0.117*** 0.129* 
 (0.036) (0.012) (0.008) (0.07) 
lt 0.530*** 0.561*** 0.325*** 0.437** 
 (0.060) (0.011) (0.016) (0.036) 
yt-1 0.797***    
 (0.033)    
kt-1 0.019    
 (0.048)    
lt-1 -0.209***    
 (0.055)    
Constant 0.655***    
 (0.113)    
Observations 27155 49687 51815 42631 
No Firms 6529 9029 9319 6477 
Wald test/p value 139.95/0.000 655.4/0.000 687.17/0.000 5.41/0.02 
AR(1)/p value -5.178/0.000    
AR(2)/p value -0.598/0.549    
Sargan/p value 78.593/0.137    
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses with * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. GMM-SYS standard 
errors are clustered robust. The GMM-SYS is the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and 
includes year fixed effects. The instruments included in the differenced equation in GMM-SYS are lagged 
values of the endogenous variables from t-2, t-3 and t-4. For the equation in levels the instruments used 
are lagged values of Δy , Δl  and Δk  for t-2, t-3 and t-4. The Sargan test refers to the orthogonality 
condition; under the null the instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term). The Wald 
test refers to the constant returns to scale hypothesis: ˆ ˆ 1l ka a+ = . OP, LP and ACF algorithms are 
specified with 100 replications. 
 
 
TFP estimates in Table 3 are derived from [2.3] for TFPINDEX and from:
ˆ ˆ ˆit it l it k itω y a l a k= − −  for models 2-5. Annual averages are shown in Table 3. Levels from 
TFPINDEX use reference points from hypothetical units (equation [2.3]) so the figures reported 
are not directly interpretable. Table 3 shows an upward trend for the period 2004-2008 with a 
co-movement of all different TFP estimates while there is a fall in 2009; the year of the 
global financial crisis. The lower section in Table 3 shows TFP growth rates; all methods but 
TFPINDEX produce an identical pattern of TFP growth with a massive deceleration of TFP for 
2009 very close to 17%. TFPINDEX shows a positive rate of TFP for 2009 which is unexpected 
given the consistent growth pattern from the other group of estimates. This result is more 
likely a symptom of large measurement errors in the data that the index number approach 
fails to account for.   
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Table 3: TFP Estimates for UK Manufacturing Firms, 2004-2011 
Levels 
 TFPINDEX TFPGMM-SYS TFPOP TFPLP TFPACF 
2004 -0.599 2.394 5.390 5.701 5.068 
2005 -0.469 2.478 5.461 5.768 5.138 
2006 -0.445 2.546 5.516 5.820 5.193 
2007 -0.411 2.641 5.605 5.908 5.282 
2008 -0.395 2.713 5.666 5.971 5.348 
2009 -0.308 2.554 5.449 5.750 5.138 
2010 -0.293 2.659 5.548 5.851 5.241 
2011 -0.276 2.730 5.622 5.930 5.318 
Mean -0.383 2.602 5.538 5.843 5.223 
Growth Rates (%) 
 
TFPINDEX TFPGMM-SYS TFPOP TFPLP TFPACF 
2005 14.422 7.037 8.495 8.557 8.593 
2006 3.350 4.648 7.503 7.476 7.488 
2007 3.611 8.258 10.401 10.623 10.406 
2008 2.455 9.312 7.629 8.074 8.100 
2009 7.841 -15.133 -17.772 -17.943 -17.376 
2010 2.345 8.084 10.287 10.690 10.742 
2011 -0.741 4.561 5.700 6.244 5.971 
Mean 4.273 3.804 4.583 4.820 4.842 
 
  
Table 4 shows spearman correlation between the TFP estimates considered in the paper. 
Not surprisingly, correlation between all three semi-parametric approaches is high, above 
0.90; and it is also high between these three and TFPGMM-SYS. The degree of correlation is 
lower between TFPINDEX and the other approaches, reflecting that the index number is a pure 
Divisia index without representing any structural micro behavior in the DGP. To address 
more formally the hypothesis that 2009 is a recession year that is sourced in the global 
financial crisis, we regress each of these five TFP indices on a set of year dummies. Those 
results are shown in Table 5. There are considerable differences in the estimated coefficients 
of year dummies among TFP measures. The year dummy coefficients are smaller in TFPOP, 
TFPLP and TFPACF while they tend to be larger in TFPINDEX and TFPGMM-SYS. Table 4 reveals 
a distinct pattern of lower TFP that can be as high as 29% if the Tőrnqvist TFPINDEX is 
considered. The semi-parametric algorithms indicate a fall in TFP in 2009 between 5 to 7%. 
Considering these estimates the 2009 global financial crisis has undoubtedly caused negative 
effects on TFP of UK Manufacturing firms regardless of the way it is measured; nevertheless 
the size of this effect might vary across TFP estimates. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Different TFP Measures  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 TFPINDEX TFPGMM-SYS TFPOP TFPLP TFPACF 
TFPINDEX 1     
TFPGMM 0.457 1    
TFPOP 0.390 0.800 1   
TFPLP 0.426 0.776 0.977 1  
TFPACF 0.526 0.805 0.985 0.987 1 
Notes: Spearman Correlations 
 
 
Table 5: OLS Results from Five Different TFP Measures on Year Dummies, UK 
Manufacturing Firms 
 TFPINDEX TFPGMM-SYS TFPOP TFPLP TFPACF 
year=2005 0.130*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 
 (5.31) (4.30) (3.88) (3.54) (3.96) 
year=2006 0.154*** 0.104*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 
 (6.34) (6.92) (6.97) (6.36) (7.14) 
year=2007 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.215*** 0.207*** 0.214*** 
 (7.75) (12.91) (12.21) (11.33) (12.53) 
year=2008 0.204*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.270*** 0.280*** 
 (8.41) (18.87) (15.73) (14.84) (16.40) 
year=2009 -0.291*** -0.130*** -0.060*** -0.049*** -0.070*** 
 (12.44) (8.94) (3.45) (2.77) (4.22) 
year=2010 0.306*** 0.216*** 0.157*** 0.150*** 0.172*** 
 (13.19) (15.14) (9.35) (8.60) (10.51) 
year=2011 0.323*** 0.291*** 0.212*** 0.229*** 0.200*** 
 (14.07) (20.82) (14.02) (13.30) (15.48) 
Constant -0.599*** 1.724*** 5.390*** 5.701*** 5.068*** 
 (34.12) (154.74) (406.90) (414.24) (393.98) 
Observations 51818 51815 51818 51818 51818 
R-square 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.010 
F-statistic 43.482 107.550 66.411 61.350 73.520 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors and *indicates p< 
0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. Each column measures TFP using a different approach, see the 
text for further details. 
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3. Evaluate the role of fiscal policy on TFP Growth 
3.1 A TFP Catch-Up Model with Corporate Tax 
Building on the previous section, we now turn into a more structural model 
investigating the distortionary effects of taxation on firm TFP. As already pointed out there 
are two mechanisms first higher corporate tax increases the user cost of capital and second 
higher taxation liabilities increases financial constraints due to moral hazard and asymmetric 
information between external creditors and the firm. In both mechanisms, higher corporate 
tax liability reduces productivity enhancement investment which results in a deceleration in 
the rate of TFP. We investigate the validity of this hypothesis within a TFP catch-up model 
(Bernard and Jones, 1996a and 1996b). Accordingly, the evolution of TFP follows an 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag ADL (1, 1) process with the augmentation of a term that 
stands for TFP in the frontier F: 
 
 1 1 2 3 1ln π ln ln lnit it it Ft Ft itTFP TFP TFP TFP u− −= + + + +a a a   [0.16] 
Long–run homogeneity in [3.1] 2 3
1
1
1
+
=
−
a a
a
 implies that productivity growth depends on 
relative rather than on absolute convergence, which leads to an Error Correction Model 
(ECM): 
 12
1
ln ln π ln Ftit Ft it it
it
TFPTFP TFP u
TFP
−
−
 
∆ = ∆ + + + 
 
a l   [0.17] 
with 11= −l a . Equation [3.2] describes TFP growth in the non-frontier i as a function of the 
autonomous TFP growth in the frontier F, a vector of firm specific characteristics πit and a 
term of technology transfer from F to i. We define the frontier F as max jtTFP , the firm with 
the highest TFP in industry j at year t. Vector πit includes: 
 ( )π , & ,it it i iT R D Export=   [0.18] 
where T refers to corporate tax liability calculated from the existing statutory tax rate applied 
for different levels of firm profitability while R and E are binary variables that denote 
whether firm i is R&D and Export active. Parameter λ shows the speed of productivity 
convergence between i and F ; u is a stochastic error term. To test whether the effect of 
corporate tax on ln itTFP∆  varies with firm i’s distance from the frontier, we augment 
equation [3.2] with an interaction term: 
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1 1
ln ln π ln lnFt Ftit Ft it it it
it it
TFP TFPTFP TFP Tax u
TFP TFP
− −
− −
   
∆ = ∆ + + + × +   
   
a l µ   [0.19] 
  
with µ  to capture whether corporate tax liability affects the TFP catch-up process in i.17 
Based on our previous discussion, we estimate [3.2] and [3.4] measuring TFP with the ACF 
algorithm. ACF estimation provides the most meaningful coefficients of capital and labour 
for the sample of UK manufacturing firms in the presence of selection bias.  As a robustness 
check, we also provide results from TFPGMM-SYS (Appendix 4). Given that TFPACF, TFPOP 
and TFPLP are highly correlated as shown in Table 4, results for [3.2] and [3.4] are not 
expected to vary substantially when TFPOP and TFPLP are employed.18  
  
3.2 Definition of Tax, R&D and Export Variables 
The profit-loss accounts in FAME report the corporate tax bill for each i.19 To capture 
the notion of Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) (Dwenger, 2014) and how this affects the 
user cost of capital we use the different statutory tax rate applied for firms of different size 
(as measured by the levels of profits). Therefore, the benchmark measure of Corporate Tax 
Liability (T) is: 
 
5
1
it s ts
s
it
it
EBIT
T
EBIT
=
− Μ ×
=
∑ t( )
  [0.20] 
Where EBIT is Earnings Before Interest and Taxes as reported in FAME, M is the size 
threshold for which the statutory tax rate changes and τ is the statutory tax rate (Appendix 2) 
for firm size s in year t.20 The statutory tax rate might change little over time for some group 
of firms but for small and very large sized firms there are substantial changes in the period 
under study. Summary statistics for T are shown in Appendix 3. 
17 Excluding the corporate tax variable, equation [3.4] is similar to the productivity convergence model of 
Griffith et al. (2009). 
18 Results of [3.2] and [3.4] for TFP estimates derived from OP and LP are not reported here to save space; they 
are available from the authors upon request. 
19 Despite having a much lower statutory rate than most G7 countries, the UK raises substantial revenue from 
corporation tax, typically as much or more (proportionally to GDP) as other G7 countries (Devereux and Loretz, 
2011). However, the distribution of payments across companies is highly skewed, with 1 percent of companies 
contributing about 80 percent of total revenue. 
20 We drop observations with zero or negative EBIT values following Devereux and Loretz (2011).   
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R&D and exports are binary variables taking value 1 if firm i is R&D (export) active 
and 0 otherwise. We count as R&D active firms those with R&D expenditure data in balance 
sheets for all eight years of the period 2004-2011. This definition might cause a downward 
bias for the number of R&D active firms but we prefer focusing on established R&D firms to 
including firms that occasionally report R&D expenditure for tax relief. Likewise, we use a 
“strict” definition for exporters assigning value 1 only to continuous exporters (i.e. firms with 
export data for all 8 years of the sample period).21 Figures 1 and 2 show the superiority in 
TFPACF for R&D and exporting firms, in line with the evidence in other countries that R&D 
activity matters for TFP (see Bengoa et al., 2017). The TFP level of these firms over the 
period, 2004-2011, is clearly above the sample average, which also implies that these groups 
of firms might also be subject to a higher tax bill due to higher levels of profitability 
    
Figure 1: Average TFP Levels of R&D and Non-R&D UK Firms, 2004-2011 
 
21 We experiment with sporadic exporters too, firms with exports for at least four years (half of the sample). 
Econometric estimates for the coefficient of export dummies when E=1 also include sporadic exporters and tend 
to be higher; those results are not shown in the paper but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 2: Average TFP Levels of Exporters and Non-Exporters UK Firms, 2004-2011 
 
 
Figure 3 compares the distance from the TFPACF frontier for R&D and exporting firms 
versus the inactive groups. On average, R&D and export active firms have a smaller distance 
to the frontier. Note the time span is short relative to standard macro panel data series; so 
Figure 3 might not capture in full the dynamics of the convergence process, which implies 
that these differences are likely to be larger for the sample of UK manufacturing firms. 
Nonetheless, this descriptive evidence indicates that there are persistent TFP differentials 
between groups of firms that are exposed to a different degree of risk. The latter indication 
also raises the issue whether TFP between groups responds differently after changes in tax 
policy.    
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Figure 3: Distance from the Technological Frontier for Different Groups 
 
Note: Distance is calculated as 1- 1
1
exp it
Ft
TFP
TFP
−
−
 
 
 
 with F to be the firm with highest value of TFPACF in 
industry j at year t.  
 
3.3 Econometric Estimation and Results for R&D and Exporters 
We proceed with the estimation of [3.2] after adding year and sector (four-digit NACE 
(Rev2)) fixed effects to capture common macroeconomic shocks and fixed idiosyncrasies at 
the industry level. For the ease of exposition, we define 11
1
it
it
Ft
TFPGAP
TFP
−
−
−
=  and we posit a 
negative coefficient showing that laggard firms tend to grow faster. Specification [3.4] with 
the interaction term inclusive assesses whether corporate tax affects the speed of 
technological catch-up. It follows from the above that a positive μˆ  is expected, representing 
the distortionary character of T in the process of productivity convergence between i and F. 
Using OLS to estimate [3.2] and [3.4] is problematic due to endogeneity between ln itTFP∆ , 
GAP and T. In principle, each firm of the same (or very similar) size faces a common- 
exogenously determined- corporate statutory tax rate. Nevertheless, if firms experience 
higher rates of lnTFP∆ , the tax liability also increases without necessarily reflecting  
anything behavioral about the distortionary effect of taxation on productivity growth. In other 
words, ln itTFP∆  and tax liability have causal effects - 0[ , ]i iCov Tax u ≠  - so OLS estimates 
0.440 0.450 0.460 0.470 0.480 0.490 0.500 0.510
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are biased. To address endogeneity bias,22 we employ GMM considering industry aggregates 
as potential instruments. This identification strategy relies on the assumption that errors are 
largely idiosyncratic to the firm but remain uncorrelated to industry aggregate values (Fisman 
and Svensson, 2007). In that sense, individual firms may blame the high tax burden for their 
lower rates of ln itTFP∆  but it is less likely that all firms in the industry will engage in such 
blame shifting (Ayyagari et al., 2008). This gives us a good reasoning to argue that causality 
runs from industry level aggregation to individual firms and not vice-versa. We select as 
instruments the values in periods t-2 and t-3 of the following industry aggregate variables: tax 
liability, equity, profit rate and TFP23. We assess the validity of this identification strategy 
with the orthogonality condition Sargan test, 0|i iE Z u  =  , where Z is the set of 
instruments. We also report the Anderson LM test for under-identification, 0[ , ]iCov Z Tax ≠ . 
The latter test rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are relevant; so the 
equation is under-identified while the Sargan test of instrument validity fails to reject the null 
about instruments’ exogeneity. Overall, this evidence supports the choice of industry 
aggregates as instruments for the endogenous variables in specifications [3.2] and [3.4].24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 IV estimators are also advisable when variables are “noisy”, which is often the case for firm level TFP. The 
semi-parametric calculations of TFP account for simultaneity bias between inputs and productivity, although 
there are still some unresolved issues such as the degree of capital utilization that might lead to measurement 
errors. Capital is not always fully utilized introducing short-term variations that do not always reflect technical 
change. 
23 Equity is defined as the ratio of total assets minus long run liabilities over total assets, while profit rate is the 
ratio of operational profit to total sales. 
24 We also consider an alternative method of instrumentation using as instruments higher order lags of the 
endogenous variables. Although, these instruments pass the under-identification test they fail to satisfy the 
orthogonality condition of the Sargan test.  
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Table 6: GMM Estimates of a TFP Catch Up Model with Tax Liability, UK Firms 2004-2011 
 Full Sample Full Sample R&D Non-
R&D 
Exporters Non-Exporters 
ΔlnTFPF 0.571*** 0.298*** 0.276** 0.237*** 0.267*** 0.145*** 
 (6.53) (8.38) (2.15) (6.08) (4.67) (3.94) 
GAP -0.614*** -0.757*** -0.572 -0.404*** -0.225*** -0.046*** 
 (5.46) (8.36) (1.08) (6.01) (4.59) (3.84) 
Tt-1 -0.650*** -0.486*** -0.236*** -0.851 -0.486** -0.285 
 (9.08) (5.50) (2.74) (0.41) (2.53) (1.09) 
(GAP×T)t-1  4.206*** 1.929* 1.244** 4.714 10.061 
  (5.35) (1.70) (2.12) (0.32) (0.82) 
R&D 0.261*** 0.039   0.444*** 0.428*** 
 (5.34) (0.36)   (3.32) (2.95) 
Export 0.090*** 0.014 -0.029 0.154***   
 (4.64) (0.36) (1.03) (4.27)   
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31812 36946 4330 32616 25147 11799 
Anderson LM 31.438 11.726 4.073 20.427 11.121 8.331 
p value 0.000 0.003 0.254 0.000 0.011 0.040 
Sargan 3.229 3.215 2.704 1.87 1.286 3.889 
p value 0.199 0.173 0.254 0.351 0.14 0.189 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. TFP calculations are derived from the 
Ackerberg et al.,2015 algorithm. The instruments in all specifications are industry aggregates of T, profit rate, 
equity and TFP at the NACE Rev 2 level in periods t-2 and t-3. The Sargan test refers to the orthogonality 
condition; under the null the instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. The Anderson LM 
test refers to the relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable; under the null the set of instruments 
used is weak. GAP stands for the TFP distance of a given firm from the industry frontier. T refers to the tax due 
by the firm according to the relevant tax rate for each specific year during the sample. R&D is a dummy variable 
taking the value one if a firm is research active (report R&D expenditures for all years of the sample) and zero 
otherwise. Export is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is an exporter for all the years of the 
sample and zero otherwise 
 
 
Table 6 reports GMM results.  Column 1 shows estimates from specification [3.2]. The effect 
of industry frontier’s TFP growth is positive signifying the existence of positive spillovers 
initiated from more productive firms in the industry. A 1% increase in the TFP growth of F 
increases growth rate in i by 0.57 percentage points. The coefficient of GAP is negative and 
highly significant confirming the hypothesis that TFP of laggard firms tend to experience 
faster TFP growth rates. More importantly, the effect of corporate tax liability on Δ ln itTFP  is 
negative and significant in statistical terms. A 1% increase in T decreases Δ ln itTFP  by 0.65 
percentage points. The size of this effect is larger to what Gemmell et al. (2016) documented 
for a larger number of OECD countries.  R&D and exporting firms experience higher growth 
of TFP, which is evidence that risk taking activities are associated with better productivity 
performance. In column (2), we show results for specification [3.4] which includes the 
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interaction term 1[ ]tGAP Tax −× . The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant implying that the pace of TFP convergence decelerates with higher 
levels of tax liability.  
Columns (3) to (6) examine whether the role of corporate tax varies between groups of 
firms with reference to their R&D and export status. We first distinguish between R&D and 
non-R&D firms. The GAP term is insignificant in the former group signifying that firms 
engaged into innovation are already very close to the frontier; so gains from convergence 
towards the frontier are limited. The tax coefficient remains negative and statistically 
significant for the group of R&D firms while it is now insignificant for the non-R&D group. 
The interaction term 1[ ]tGAP Tax −×  for the group of R&D firms is significant only at the 
10% level with a much smaller coefficient compared to the one in the full sample of firms.  
This is a key difference between firms that undertake R&D projects and are exposed to 
higher degree of uncertainty. The higher level of tax liability weakens the borrowing capacity 
of firms that invest in innovation which can potentially discourage the generation of new 
knowledge (see for example Bournakis et al., 2017). A similar effect is also revealed when we 
split the sample between exporters and non-exporters, columns (5) and (6). The higher level 
of tax liability impacts negatively on the group of exporters while the group of non-exporters 
is unaffected. Column (5) also indicates that the rate of TFP convergence for exporters is also 
driven from tax liability. Likewise, with R&D firms, corporate tax generates credit 
constraints that impede international market expansion of export oriented firms.  Overall, 
results in Table 5 clearly suggest that corporate tax causes distortionary effects on 
productivity and these effects are not driven from endogeneity bias between T, GAP and 
ln itΔ TFP . A similar outcome holds for the negative repercussions of higher tax levels on 
convergence towards the frontier for the R&D group. 
A further sensitivity test is to investigate whether results shown in Table 5 are robust to 
an alternative definition of the tax variable. The tax liability variable defined in [3.5] 
represents what a firm is ought to pay without capturing firm’s efforts to shift the amount of 
tax bill on the pre-tax profits.25 To see the actual amount of tax paid we use a tax definition 
closer to the concept of the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR). 26 Our second tax measure 
25 Devereux and Lorenz (2011) note that it is common to expect firms with different ownership status to alter the 
real value of EBIT purely for tax relief purposes. 
26 We refer to Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2002, and 2003) and Simmler (2012) for more sophisticated 
definitions of Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR). Despite its simplicity our ETR variables is a transparent and 
adequate measure in capturing what a profit maximizing entrepreneur considers when making investment 
decisions (Djankov et al. 2008).   
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is the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) using information only from FAME and it is defined as the 
share of Corporate Tax to EBIT. We replicate GMM estimations of [3.2] and [3.4] with the 
same instrument identification strategy as in Table 6 with ETR. Results are shown in Table 7. 
In the full sample, the size of the ETR effect on Δ ln itTFP is somehow smaller, 0.30, which 
already reflects productivity benefits from the lower ETR paid.27 The same applies for the 
effect of ETR on the TFP convergence process, which is now significant only at the 10% 
level and almost half of the size of the coefficient 1( )tGAP T −× . The autonomous effect of 
ETR for different groups reinforces our previous results that the risk taking groups are more 
severely affected from a higher level of corporate tax. It should be noted that the size of the 
ETR coefficient in column (3) is much higher than the coefficient of T. Overall, there are two 
qualifying messages for the results shown in Tables 5 and 6. First, higher corporate tax 
payments aggravate capital investment decisions mainly by reducing the amount of working 
capital, which is the main asset that firms can use to secure external funding. Second, there is 
disproportionate effect of corporate tax on firms that are more dependent on external finance 
and exposed at higher risk such as R&D and exporting. 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 The sample average for ETR is 12.6% as a share to Taxable profit while for T is 16.2%. 
28 We also run additional set of robustness checks with F to be defined as the 5% of firms with the highest TFP 
in the industry at year t and the firm with the highest TFP across all industries in year t. Our results remain 
robust with regard to the distortionary effect of tax liability and its effect on the convergence process of laggard 
firms. Finally, we reproduce estimates of [3.2] and [3.4] with the GMM-SYS methodology of measuring TFP, 
results are shown in the Appendix 4. The message of Tables 5 and 6 prevails. The only remarkable difference 
between Tables 5 and 6 and Appendix 4 is that the distortionary effect of tax liability is now present in the non-
exporting group as well. 
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 Table 7: GMM Estimates of a TFP Catch Up Model with Effective Tax Rate (ETR), UK 
Firms 2004-2011 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
R&D Non-
R&D 
Exporters Non-
Exporters 
ΔlnTFPF 0.315*** 0.755*** 0.389 0.665** 0.75*** 0.699** 
 (6.20) (3.16) (1.17) (2.34) (4.12) (2.44) 
GAP -0.310*** -0.870*** -0.594 -0.736** -0.867*** -0.790** 
 (4.33) (2.87) (1.40) (2.02) (4.05) (2.13) 
ETRt-1 -0.308** -0.47* -0.79*** -0.052 -0.301*** -2.909 
 (2.52) (1.88) (3.46) (1.35) (3.55) (1.30) 
(GAP×ETR)t-1  2.281* -1.159 3.418 0.512*** 3.239 
  (1.72) (0.24) (1.17) (3.62) (1.12) 
R&D 0.001 0.002   -0.017 0.001 
 (0.09) (0.27)   (1.06) (0.05) 
Export 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.008   
 (0.70) (0.35) (0.40) (0.93)   
Industry 
dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30568 30557 3518 27039 7393 23164 
Anderson LM 1013.143 65.012 30.112 51.763 26.588 52.528 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 7.272 8.143 13.756 9.273 2.549 2.107 
p value 0.12 0.163 0.131 0.331 0.863 0.71 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. TFP calculations are derived from the 
Ackerberg et al., 2015 algorithm. The instruments in all specifications are the average values of TFP, ETR, 
profit rate, equity at the NACE Rev. 2 industry level in periods t-2 and t-3. The Sargan test refers to the 
orthogonality condition; under the null the instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. The 
Anderson LM test refers to the relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable; under the null the set of 
instruments used is weak. GAP stands for the distance of productivity of a given firm from the industry frontier. 
ETR is the ratio of corporate tax over EBIT. R&D is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is research 
active (report R&D expenditures for all years of the sample) and zero otherwise. Export is a dummy variable 
taking the value one if a firm is an exporter for all the years of the sample and zero otherwise 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper has provided a methodological overview of TFP estimation for UK 
Manufacturing firms over the period 2004-2011. The first part of the paper explored the 
limitations and merits of existing methodologies arguing that TFP computation in empirical 
studies should not be treated as a mechanical issue or of secondary importance. Indeed, our 
empirical experiment in Table 5 shows that the effect of the global financial crisis in 2009 on 
productivity varies depending on the TFP method chosen. Our estimations show that the 
methodology of Ackerberg et al. (2015) treats labour as a dynamic input whose choice affects 
future profits providing the most plausible estimates for capital and labour inputs. The semi-
parametric techniques of Olley and Pakes (1996) produce a statistically insignificant estimate 
of capital which is controversial, while the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach produces 
an unexpectedly low estimate for labor. Only the ACF methodology provides results that can 
be regarded as in line with the macro growth accounting literature. The use of non-parametric 
techniques appeared to be the least suitable for firm level estimations of TFP as it fails to 
control for measurement error that is usually present in the data. The GMM-SYS estimator is 
the second best option after the ACF estimator. This approach controls for the standard 
simultaneity bias between unobserved productivity and selection of inputs, while it also 
corrects for measurement error, with the only caveat concerning GMM-SYS that instrument 
identification is always subject to empirical scrutiny depending on the dataset in use.   
The second part of the paper uses a more structural approach to analyse the impact of 
corporate taxation on productivity within a TFP catch-up framework. We contribute to the 
limited body of micro-evidence in the tax-productivity domain. Evidence shown in the paper 
suggests that higher rates of corporate taxation slow down the rate of TFP growth. This 
finding remains robust regardless of the way we derive TFP. There are quantitative 
differences in the size of this effect depending on the TFP estimation used but higher 
corporate tax payments always affect productivity enhancing investment that decelerate the 
growth of TFP.  This effect is higher for firms with higher exposure to risk and those who are 
more financially constrained.  Our findings provide evidence in favour of theoretical models 
that highlight the importance of asymmetric information and moral hazard in the allocation of 
external funds. A policy message from the present study is that the design and reform of any 
tax system should be tolerant to firms that undertake risk. The activities of these firms usually 
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generate substantial knowledge returns that bring beneficial productivity spillovers to the rest 
of the economy.    
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Description of Variables 
Name Definition  
y Total Sales in logs adjusted for the cost of materials 
and firm inventories converted to real values using 4-
digit NACE industry specific PPI  
k Total fixed assets in logs converted into real values 
with an industry invariant capital price index taken 
from ONS.  
l Number of Employees 
m Cost of Materials in logs converted into real values 
with an industry invariant material price index taken 
from ONS. 
T  Tax Liability as defined in Equation [3.5]  
τ  Statutory Tax Rate, taken from Devereux and Loretz 
(2011) 
Taxable Profit Profits before Tax (PbT) 
ETR The ratio of Corporate Taxation over EBIT 
EBIT Earnings before Income and Tax, variable reported 
as operating Profit   
R&D  R&D=1 if firm reports R&D Expenditures for all 8 
years and 0 otherwise. 
Export  Continuous Exporter:  
Export=1 if firm reports turnover for overseas sales 
for all 8 years and 0 otherwise. 
Sporadic Exporter: 
Export=1 if firm reports turnover for overseas sales 
for at least 4 years and 0 otherwise.  
Industry Profit Rate  Operational profit over total sales, average values 
across NACE Rev2 
Industry Equity (Total Assets – Long Term Liabilities)/ Total Assets  
Notes: All data are taken from FAME unless stated otherwise. 
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 Appendix 2: UK Statutory Corporate Tax Rate Schedule   
Taxable profit  2000/01 to 
2001/02 
2002/03 to 
2005/06 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 to 
2010/11 
0 to 10,000 10% 0% 19% 20% 21% 
10,001 to 50,000 22.5% 23.75% 19% 20% 21% 
50,001 to 300,000 20% 19% 19% 20% 21% 
300,000 to 1,500,000 32.5% 32.75% 32.75% 32.5% 29.75% 
More than 1,500,001 30% 30% 30% 30% 28% 
Source: Devereux and Lorenz, 2011 
 
Appendix 3: Tax Liability and Effective Tax Rate (ETR) of UK Firms for Different 
Percentiles  
Year Mean Std. Dev. p50 p75 p90 
T 
2005 0.160 0.031 0.168 0.190 0.190 
2006 0.190 0.001 0.190 0.190 0.190 
2007 0.200 0.000 0.200 0.200 0.200 
2008 0.210 0.000 0.210 0.210 0.210 
2009 0.210 0.000 0.210 0.210 0.210 
2010 0.210 0.000 0.210 0.210 0.210 
2011 0.200 0.000 0.200 0.200 0.200 
Average 0.203 0.008 0.210 0.210 0.210 
ETR 
2004 0.162 0.146 0.149 0.263 0.383 
2005 0.158 0.146 0.144 0.265 0.375 
2006 0.159 0.148 0.144 0.266 0.385 
2007 0.157 0.147 0.140 0.264 0.374 
2008 0.158 0.150 0.139 0.266 0.391 
2009 0.153 0.148 0.132 0.260 0.380 
2010 0.141 0.138 0.123 0.241 0.325 
2011 0.130 0.128 0.114 0.220 0.290 
Average 0.151 0.144 0.134 0.252 0.359 
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Appendix 4: Estimates from a TFP Catch Up Model, Specifications [3.2] and [3.4] with 
TFPGMM-SYS, UK Firms 2004-2011 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
R&D Non-R&D Exporters Non-
Exporters 
ΔlnTFPF 1.226*** 1.122*** -0.065 1.124*** 0.508 1.749*** 
 (18.09) (4.89) (0.06) (5.17) (1.44) (5.18) 
GAP -2.435*** -2.228*** 0.356 -0.235*** -0.963 -0.428*** 
 (16.28) (4.88) (0.16) (5.14) (1.37) (5.14) 
Taxt-1 -0.408*** -0.168** -0.459*** 0.121 -0.170** -0.048** 
 (6.45) (2.13) (3.04) (0.10) (2.04) (1.98) 
(GAP×T)t-1  1.136 0.088 0.938** 0.907** 0.852* 
  (0.46) (1.19) (2.40) (2.20) (1.71) 
R&D 0.127*** 0.128***   0.122*** 0.149*** 
 (10.78) (10.72)   (7.62) (7.58) 
Export 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.016 0.028***   
 (3.86) (3.87) (0.69) (4.04)   
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 36943 36943 4330 32613 19001 17942 
Anderson LM 322.102 211.625 12.163 214.672 78.662 112.564 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 2.585 2.760 5.374 1.084 2.678 0.077 
p value 0.108 0.097 0.068 0.298 0.102 0.781 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. TFP calculations are derived from a 
parametric GMM-SYS estimation of [2.3]. The instruments in all specifications are industry aggregates of T, 
profit rate, equity and TFP at the NACE Rev 2 level in periods t-2 and t-3. The Sargan test refers to the 
orthogonality condition; under the null the instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. The 
Anderson LM test refers to the relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable; under the null the set of 
instruments used is weak. GAP stands for the TFP distance of a given firm from the industry frontier. T refers to 
the tax due by the firm according to the relevant tax rate for each specific year during the sample. R&D is a 
dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is research active (report R&D expenditures for all years of the 
sample) and zero otherwise. Export is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is an exporter for all the 
years of the sample and zero otherwise 
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